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CHAPTER 7 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
MONROE INKER 
§7.1. Adoption: Interest of the child. The spirit of overriding 
social interests being held paramount in the judicial process1 was 
boldly and clearly asserted in two decisions in domestic relations by 
the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1962 SURVEY year, despite ap-
parently contrary statutory law. In In re Adoption of a Minor,2 an 
illegitimate minor child, born on November 6, 1951, was placed by 
the mother with the mother's sister on or about November 13, 1951, 
under an agreement that the child would be returned should the 
mother ever marry and be able to provide a home for the child. The 
mother agreed to pay the sister ten dollars a week for the child's care. 
Approximately two years after the mother had married she petitioned 
to adopt the child, who had then been in the sister's home for six and 
one-half years. The sister subsequently petitioned also to adopt the 
child. The two petitions were heard together and the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, in affirming the decision of the Probate Court allowing 
the sister's petition, held that the interests of the child were of primary 
consideration, being superior to any conflicting claims and interests 
of the natural parents, and since the child had become an integral 
part of the sister's family, those interests would best be served by 
allowing her adoption into that family.s 
The applicable statute4 provides that no decree of adoption of an 
illegitimate child shall be made without the consent of the mother. 
Since the mother neither expressly nor impliedly consented to the 
adoption by the sister, the Court was forced to fit the facts within the 
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§7.l. 1 This emphasis on social utility has been explained and analyzed by at 
least three of our leading scholars: Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 189 
(1921); Cardozo, Nature of Judicial Process (1925); Uewellyn, The Common Law 
Tradition (1961). 
2 !l4!1 Mass. 292,178 N.E.2d 264 (1961). 
8 A 1959 decision had a result somewhat like the present case, but in that case 
the mother and the natural father had placed the child for adoption. The Court 
was unwilling to allow revocation of consent, and granted the adoption. In re 
Adoption of a Minor, !I!I8 Mass. 6!15, 156 N.l!..2d 801 (1959). 
4 G.L., c. 210, §2. 
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§7.1 DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND PERSONS 79 
statutory exception5 to achieve the result. It accomplished this by 
finding that the mother had willfully neglected to provide support 
for her child for the six years preceding the petition for adoption, and 
held that the mother's conduct brought the case within the exception. 
The question of consent in the present case was neatly resolved by 
the Court, but underlying the simple conclusion that consent was not 
required lies a cobweb of disturbing problems.6 How, for example, 
could this "abandonment" (if indeed there was an abandonment) be 
"willful" in view of the arrangement made by the mother and her 
sister that the mother would take the child back should she ever marry 
and be able to provide a home for the child? The Court said "will-
ful" did not require that the neglect of the child be with malevolence 
or ill will, but only that it was not unintentional.7 By use of the 
double negative the Court has circumvented the usual construction 
of willfulness in adoption statutes, meaning a settled intent (affirm-
atively) to renounce the parental duties.s 
The decision in In re Adoption of a Minor is grounded on the 
Court's interpretation of the applicable statutes,9 but the Court in 
achieving the result also invoked the rule that any interest of the 
natural parent must be subordinated to that of the child. Faced with 
the Probate Court judge's statement that "materially each set of peti-
tioners can offer approximately the same advantages to the child and 
each would be worthy adoptive parents," the Court nevertheless rea-
soned that the scales were tipped in favor of the sister's petition 
because the minor had in ten years become an integral part of that 
home. 
The Supreme Judicial Court here gave primary and paramount 
consideration to the welfare of the child, in a decision that is unques-
tionably a departure from previous decisions in Massachusetts,10 and 
which places this Commonwealth in the majority of jurisdictions that 
accept the modem trend away from the earlier emphasis on the parents 
and family interest and toward the child's interest.11 
6Id. §3. 
6 See Comment, A Compilation of Consent Provisions of Adoption Statutes, 24 
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 359 (1952), for a listing of situations in which consent is not 
usually required. 
7343 Mass. 292, 297, 178 N.E.2d 264, 267 (1961). 
8 For an excellent survey of the law in this area, see Annotation, 35 A.L.R.2d 
662 (1954). A result contrary to the present case was reached in Re Anderson, 189 
Minn. 85,248 N.W. 657 (1933). 
Willfulness would seem to be even a stronger term than mere intention, i.e., the 
act must be purposeful and deliberately in violation of the law. Truelove v. Parker, 
191 N.C. 430, 132 S.E. 295 (1926). 
9 G.L., c. 210, §§2, 3. 
10 Stinson v. Meegan, 318 Mass. 459, 62 N.E.2d 113 (1945); Gordon v. Gordon, 317 
Mass. 471, 59 N.E.2d 5 (1945); Richard v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 180 N.E. 508 
(1932). 
11 See, for example, Quarles, The Law of Adoption - A Legal Anomaly, 32 
Marq. L. Rev. 237 (1949); Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 
Vand. L. Rev. 743 (1956). 
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§7.2. Adoption: Mother's consent. In the other significant adop-
tion case decided during the 1962 SURVEY year, Surrender of Minor 
Children,1 the Court held that consent given to the Massachusetts 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children for the purpose of 
adoption could not be revoked. Here, an unmarried mother, classi-
fied as a moron with an I.Q. of 60,2 had formally surrendered to the 
society her four illegitimate children and by a court order they were 
placed in the custody of the Department of Public Welfare.s Twenty-
two days after executing these documents the mother sent to the society 
a purported revocation of the surrenders. The society petitioned the 
Probate Court to determine whether the mother's consent was required 
for subsequent petitions of adoption. The probate judge decreed that 
the surrenders were void and that the petition be dismissed. These 
surrenders were attacked by the mother on the grounds of involun-
tariness, undue influence and a lack of a full understanding of the 
facts. A majority of the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Probate 
Court, holding that the surrenders were voluntary, that no undue 
influence was noted and that the mother had a full understanding of 
the facts. The Court then concluded that the statutory adoption 
provisions applied,4 and that since the consent was voluntary, it may 
be withdrawn only with the approval of the probate judge. Further-
more the probate judge, in granting or withholding his assent, is to 
be guided primarily by the welfare of the child. In the Court's words, 
"the welfare of the child comes first and the rights of society must be 
regarded." 
Generally there are three different rules governing the revocation 
of consent: 
(I) Consent is absolutely revocable until the final decree; 
(2) Consent is final absent fraud or duress; and 
(3) Revocation is allowed at the discretion of the court'!! 
Until recently the majority rule seemed to be that the consent may 
be withdrawn any time before the final decree, but the modern trend 
seems to support the discretion-of-judge rule.6 This now appears to 
§7.2. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 655, 181 N.E.2d 8l16. 
2 The mother had been confined to the Belchertown State School for six years 
from January 20, 1949, to April 24, 1955, and had been discharged "against the 
recommendation of the school authorities." 
S In March, 1960, the mother was pregnant and in jail awaiting trial for fornica-
tion. The society on March 25 brought a proceeding under G.L., c. 119, §§24-26, as 
appearing in Acts of 1945, c. 646, §l. On April 12, 1960, by an order in the proceed-
ing under Chapter 119, the district court placed the children in the custOdy of the 
Department of Public Welfare, which order was confirmed on appeal to the Su-
perior Court. 
4 G.L., c. 210, §lI, as amended by Acts of 1955, c. 89. 
Ii Annotation, Il18 A.L.R. 10118 (1942); Note, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 564 (1961). 
6 See the thorough compilation of the present law of all jurisdictions in Note, 28 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 564 (1961). Michigan appears to be closest to Massachusetts but 
makes the distinction between consent to adoption and absolute surrender of the 
custody of the child to an agency, thereby terminating parental rights. Michigan 
holds the consent revocable at will, but the surrender to an agency is irrevocable. 
In re White's Adoption, lIOO Mich. 378, I N.W.2d 579 (1942). 
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be the majority.7 Massachusetts had been in the minority with an 
early holding that consent once given may not be arbitrarily revoked.s 
The importance of the present decision is twofold: (1) there is now 
in Massachusetts very little if any distinction between surrender to an 
agency and consent to specific adoption; (2) consent may be revoked 
only in the discretion of the court. This is dictum but seems to be 
implied from the decision. If this is now the law in this Common-
wealth, Massachusetts would be adhering to the majority position. 
The underlying problem here is the head-on collision between the 
provisions of G.L., c. 210, §3, where no consent is required if originally 
given to the society, and G.L., c. 210, §3A, which is a separate pro-
ceedings to determine necessity of consent. The majority held that 
Section 3 applied, whereas Mr. Justice Kirk, in his dissent, considered 
the petition herein a Section 3A proceeding. 
§7.3. Support and alimony: Second marriage. In Gerrig v. Sneier-
son,1 a husband and wife, who were living apart, entered into a written 
agreement with trustees which contained the following provision: 
Contingent upon the procuring by the wife of an absolute decree 
of divorce the husband agrees as follows: (a) To pay to the wife 
the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) per week as alimony for 
her support for a period of twenty (20) years from the date of the 
decree absolute of divorce, or until the remarriage of the wife, 
whichever comes first . . . 
A decree nisi which contained no reference to the written agreement 
was entered on the day the agreement was executed. This became 
absolute on December 21, 1957. On January 13, 1958, the wife and 
one Craft, both of whom were domiciled in Newton, went to Rhode 
Island and were married there, although Craft was prohibited from 
remarrying under the terms of G.L., c. 208, §24, as the wife well knew, 
having entered into the Rhode Island marriage for the express purpose 
of avoiding the disability of Craft and never intending to live in 
Rhode Island.2 After the marriage ceremony, they returned to Mas-
sachusetts to live in Newton as husband and wife until they separated 
on or about October 31,1958. 
This was an action of contract by the wife's trustee to recover the 
$100 weekly payments for the period from July 10, 1958, to July 21, 
7 See Note, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 564 (1961). 
8 Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758 (1935). 
§7.3. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997. 183 N.E.2d 131. 
2 A marriage entered into in a foreign jurisdiction by "any person residing and 
intending to reside in this commonwealth" is void under the laws of Massachusetts 
if such person was under an impediment to marriage here. C.L .• c. 207. §10. It 
makes no difference that one of the parties to such a marriage acted in good faith. 
Murphy v. Murphy. 249 Mass. 552. 144 N.E. 394 (1924). In the Cerrig case, the 
marriage was clearly void in Massachusetts since there was an express finding that 
the parties never intended to live in Rhode Island. 
4
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1959, and for attorney's fees.3 The trial judge found for the plaintiff 
for $5200 in weekly payments and $500 attorney's fees. 
The Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the case as presenting "an 
underlying issue of interpretation." The Court agreed that the Rhode 
Island marriage was void under the law of Massachusetts by virtue 
of the judge's finding that the plaintiff and Craft never intended to 
live in Rhode Island. However, they said: ". . . we are of opinion 
that the marriage ceremony with Craft in itself satisfied the condition 
of the contract." 4 The Court further stated: 
. The plaintiff supports his argument by quoting from Southworth 
v. Treadwell, 168 Mass. 511, 513, where a revision of a decree for 
alimony was upheld on the ground that the wife's remarriage gave 
her "the right to be supported by another man." But we are of 
opinion that the right to be so supported is not the only considera-
tion as affecting interpretation of the contract before us, a party 
to which should be entitled to rely upon the appearance of things. 
Where the wife entered into another apparent marriage,1I the con-
tract should not be read as contemplating an intermittent "ali-
mony" obligation subject to reinstatement by her going beneath 
the surface and disclosing circumstances to which the defendant 
was in no way privy. Where the defendant has no reasonable 
means of discovering such circumstances, the contract cannot be 
interpreted as contemplating that he can act only at peril in order-
ing his own affairs in reliance on appearances.6 
The Court was clearly moved by the conduct of the plaintiff. Under 
the doctrine of clean hands,7 both the wife and Craft would be pre· 
cluded from obtaining a decree of annulment. She would also be 
barred from obtaining separate support since the marital relationship 
is a jurisdictional requirement for such a proceedingS and, as we have 
seen, the Rhode Island marriage was void in Massachusetts. The 
8 Additional litigation between the parties included a successful attempt by the 
first husband to recover· payments made subsequent to the remarriage and an un-
successful attempt by the wife to hay Rhode Island marriage annulled. 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997, 999, 18!! N.E.2d 131, !!!!. 
II The theory is that an annulled marriage is .. ~ced as if it had never been," 
and therefore any prior obligation of support is unaffected. However, the annul-
ment is not related back so that this obligation would exist during the period from 
the date of remarriage to the date of annulment. See Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 
366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929); Robbins v. Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961). 
The theory has other applications, e.g., Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 
637 (1948) (tort committed during annulled marriage). See also Gaines v. Jacobsen, 
308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954), wherein it was held that the relation-back 
principle is no longer applicable in New York because of a statute that allows ali-
mony to be granted pursuant to an annulment decree. 
61962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 997, 999-1000, 18!! N.E.2d 131, 133. (Emphasis supplied.) 
7 Ewald v. Ewald, 219 Mass. Ill, 106 N.E. 567 (1914). Nor can Ewald be avoided 
by seeking a declaratory judgment that a marriage is void. Korostynski v. Korostyn-
ski, 328 Mass. 6, 101 N.E.2d 356 (1951). See also Belcher v. Belcher, 324 Mass. 757, 
88 N.E.2d 344 (1949). 
8 Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E.2d 145, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1949). 
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Court expressly avoided the question whether the doctrine of Ewald 
v. Ewald would bar recovery in an action on the contract and also 
the question whether the marriage was valid in Rhode Island.1I 
Several months earlier, the full Court had decided Robbins v. Rob-
bins.HJ There the respondent had earlier obtained a decree of divorce 
from the petitioner under the terms of which the husband was ordered 
to pay the wife $6000 and, in addition, $100 per week. After the 
decree became absolute, the wife married a Missourian named Good-
man in this Commonwealth. "Following the marriage" the respond-
ent and Goodman went to Missouri, where they lived together for 
two days. The respondent returned to Boston but instituted annul-
ment proceedings in the Circuit Court of Kansas City, Missouri, and 
obtained a decree of annulment. Thereafter the first husband filed 
this petition for modification, and the Probate Court entered a decree 
modifying the original decree by striking therefrom all provisions for 
the payment of alimony as of the date of the decree of modification.11 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and reinstated the original ali-
mony provisions as of the date of the decree of modification.12 
The Court held that the annulled marriage to Goodman did not 
constitute such a change of circumstances as to support the decree 
below. The opinion makes it plain that every case of a later marriage 
and annulment will be examined in order to determine whether they 
constitute a significant change in circumstances. 
In Gerrig} the Court did not undertake to ascertain whether there 
had been actual reliance upon the apparent change in the marital 
status of the wife. Rather there was a categorical statement that the 
contract could not be interpreted in such a way that the husband 
could "act only at peril in ordering his own affairs in reliance on 
appearances." Comparing Robbins} the key issue there was "whether 
there has been a real, as distinct from an apparent, change of circum-
stances." 
Thus a husband whose obligation to support is derived from an 
alimony decree, as in Robbins} must show an actual change of cir-
cumstances, and a subsequent marriage which is annulled does not, 
standing alone, constitute such a change; while one whose duty to 
support is based on a contract, as in Gerrig} need not show a real 
change of circumstances, but accordingly as the contract is interpreted, 
may be freed by an apparent change in circumstances. 
II The Ewald case is cited in note 7 supra. By its construction of the contract, the 
Court also avoided the question of what validity, if any, the marriage has in Rhode 
Island and how this would affect the result. 
10M!! Mass. 247,178 N.E.2d 281 (1961). 
11 It is well settled that a decree may not be modified unless a change of cir-
cumstances is shown. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 325 Mass. 57!!, 91 N.E.2d 775 (1950); 
Ziegler v. MCKinlay, 318 Mass. 765, 64 N.E.2d 15 (1945); Southworth v. Treadwell, 
168 Mass. 511, 47 N.E. 93 (1891). 
12 This is consistent with the idea that annulment will not be related back so as 
to make the prior husband liable for payments while the subsequently annulled 
marriage was still in effect. See cases cited note 5 supra. 
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Massachusetts is not alone in entertaining the foregoing views. The 
courts are nearly unanimous in holding that, in the absence of an 
express statutory provision, they have no power to modify the support 
provisions of an agreement that has not been incorporated into the 
decree. 18 An illustration of the judicial reluctance to do more than 
"interpret" such agreements is Taliaferro v. Taliaferro,14 in which the 
court declined to modify the support provisions although there was 
a statute providing: "Upon the re-marriage of the wife, the husband 
shall no longer be obligated to provide for her support but such re-
marriage shall not affect his duty to provide for the maintenance of 
the children of his marriage." 15 The court rejected the argument 
that this provision applied to all separation agreements and took the 
view that the spouses were free to contract as they pleased, free from 
judicial interference when their agreement had not been incorporated 
in the decree. 
In this Commonwealth the support provisions of a divorce decree, 
based upon an agreement of the parties, are modifiable only when the 
agreement has been incorporated into the decree and when it appears 
from the terms of the agreement that it was intended to expire by 
assimilation of its provisions into the decree.16 Mere approval of the 
agreement by the court does not deprive it of its effective existence 
apart from the decree so as to permit subsequent modification.17 
However, the Probate Court may exercise its statutory power to 
award alimony and the correlative power of modification independ-
ently of any private agreement the parties may have, "although the 
exercise of its jurisdiction may change in some respects their situation 
as contemplated by the contract." 18 Obviously the existence and 
terms of an agreement between the spouses are proper, although not 
necessarily controlling, factors to be considered by the court in fixing 
the terms of a decree for support.1l1 
In conclusion, it is to be observed that the same public policy which 
supports the modification of alimony decrees, i.e., that the husband's 
obligation to support should change as the ex-wife's circumstances 
change, would seem in principle to apply irrespective of such highly 
legalistic considerations as whether the agreement of the parties has 
been incorporated into the decree and whether it has been integrated. 
18 See Annotations, 48 A.L.R.2d 270, SI8 (1956). 
1.125 Cal. App. 2d 419, 270 P.2d IOS6 (1954). 
15 The statute, as amended in 1951, now provides: "Except as otherwise agreed 
by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party in any decree, judgment or 
order for the support and maintenance of the other party shall terminate upon the 
death of the obligor or upon the remarriage of the other party." Cal. Civ. Code 
Ann. §IS9. 
16 Fabruio v. Fabrizio, SI6 Mass. S4S, 55 N.E.2d 604 (1944). 
17 Whitney v. Whitney, SI6 Mass. S67, 55 N.E.2d 601 (1944). 
18 Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297, S02, 172 N.E. 251, 25S (19S0). 
111 Wilson v. Caswell, 272 Mass. 297,172 N.E. 251 (19S0). 
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